Group 2- American Foreign Policy Memo #2

 

To: The Biden Administration

From: Stephen Bogli, Matthew Dias, Spencer Higgs, Aidan Ridings, and Leah Tabor

Date: 3/20/2022

RE: Countering China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)

 

Issue: Combatting China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) inequalities and risks

Executive Summary: China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is a global infrastructure and development plan which encompasses one third of the world’s GDP and over 60% of the world's population. Despite the BRI’s far outreach and cooperation with developing countries, our analysis of the infrastructures development indicates that certain risks have already had negative effects on both the United States and many developing countries. Included in these risks are unfair debt obligations, high amounts of corruption, and potentially irreversible environmental and social structures. To reduce these risks, we propose three strategic options: Create a United States led BRI alternative, institute enforcement on social and environmental shortcomings through judicial systems, or deter corruption using economic sanctions. In fixing the problems of the current BRI, action must be taken quickly as once infrastructure is built, it is impossible to reverse the harm that has already been imposed on human rights and the global economy.

 

Relevant National Interests: China has been seeking to expand its international influence through its Belt and Road Initiative.  Developing from an initial focus on domestic infrastructure to a broader focus on infrastructure in developing countries, the BRI’s goals have expanded since its creation in 2013.  Countering the BRI is important for American interests because of the BRI’s effects on climate and debt.  The BRI has largely sponsored climate-unfriendly infrastructure projects, most notably coal-fired power plants, which could damage efforts by the U.S., China, and other countries to respond to the climate crisis and mitigate the effects of climate change.  It has been argued that the BRI has increased debt for developing countries and could damage these countries’ abilities to pay their debts, especially while trying to navigate the coronavirus pandemic and the lack of vaccine equity throughout the world.  Increasing debt in other developing countries could weaken their governments and ultimately hurt trade, national security, and other important points of interest that could ultimately create instability within these countries before ultimately also harming U.S. interests.  Can the U.S. and its allies successfully offer an alternative to the BRI, as is underway with the Build Back Better World (B3W) initiative?

 

Analysis: Chinese President Xi Jinping’s signature foreign policy undertaking, the Belt and Road Initiative, is now considered the world’s largest infrastructure program. Although the BRI began as an effort to connect China’s modernized, coastal cities to its underdeveloped interior and bordering neighbors, the initiative quickly outgrew is regional corridors. There are currently 139 countries involved in the initiative; members include U.S. allies and partners such as Greece, Italy, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, as well as countries that align geopolitically with China such as Cambodia and Laos. Since the initiative’s launch in 2013, Chinese corporations and banks have financed the building and development of power plants, railways, highways, ports, telecommunications infrastructure, fiber-optic cables, smart cities, and other projects around the world. The vast majority of these infrastructure projects have taken place in developing nations. If implemented sustainably and responsibly, the BRI holds the potential to meet the infrastructure and economic needs of numerous developing countries. A 2019 study conducted by economic consultants forecasted that the BRI was likely to boost world GDP by $7.1 trillion per annum by the year 2040.[1] However, there are several reasons why the United States should be wary of the Belt and Road Initiative.

·   The BRI is a central component of Xi’s “Major Country Diplomacy” strategy, which calls for China’s assumption of greater global leadership.[2] The initiative would subsidize privileged market entry for state-owned and non-market oriented Chinese companies and enable China to exert serious political pressure and project its power more widely. The BRI’s implementation of Chinese technology and technical standards would also give China the opportunity to lock developing countries into a state of dependency. The BRI may also enable China to exert a destabilizing amount of economic pressure over the energy sector; in totality, the initiative intends to “affect” three-quarters of the known energy reserves in the world.[3]

·   The initiative’s funding of “economically questionable projects” in heavily indebted countries without the utilization of expert debt sustainability analysis has the potential to undermine global stability and increase the likelihood of a near-future debt crisis.[4]

·   While BRI members are diverse, states that have refrained from joining the initiative are generally more          democratic, politically stable, and economically developed than those who have endorsed and participated in the initiative.[5]

·   The BRI’s dependence on carbon-intensive infrastructure will complicate climate change mitigation by ensuring a decades long dependence on coal-fired power plants.[6]

 

Strategic Options:

Strategy One: Create alternatives to the BRI for developing countries.

 

This could be done by expanding existing systems and practices found in the United States Export-Import Bank, the World Bank, the Blue Dot Network, and the Build Back Better World (B3W) programs and institutions featuring American participation.  Increasing American funding would be a major part of this proposal.  Current American intervention is ineffective because it only focuses on addressing part of the problem.  The Blue Dot Network (BDN) fails to fund its projects and only supervises and certifies existing projects.[7]  However, even with its flaws, India has been interested in potentially participating in BDN programs.[8]  Continuing to collaborate with America’s partners in the Group of 7 (G7) countries could also help motivate investment.  Increasing funding though the U.S. Export-Import Bank could successfully complete more infrastructure projects and perhaps even ‘complete’ BRI-led projects by making them more climate-friendly: for example, electrifying rail lines and converting power plants to make them more efficient.  Increasing trade with strategic regional allies and partners like Japan, India, and Australia could encourage more participation from allies and partners and ultimately help these development projects succeed and benefit both developed and developing countries.

 

Pros: The United States decreased funding for developing countries under the Trump administration; reversing this trend could benefit interests both for the U.S. and developing countries.  Programs led by the U.S. and allies can, and should, focus more on promoting climate-friendly and gender equality actions and investments in these countries, as China’s investments have largely been coal-fired and dangerous for climate change.[9] Focusing on climate-friendly responses would strengthen the U.S.’ influence as a leader in responding to climate change and could work to reduce risks posed by climate change.  Offering a strong alternative to the BRI could encourage competition and ultimately incite both the BRI and a U.S.-led coalition alternative to work to improve their own standards, which would benefit the U.S., its allies and partners, China, and developing countries.  The United States and its G7 partners could also be more successful than China in ensuring transparency, about the lack of which has drawn criticism from the World Bank and others.[10]

 

Cons: This funding increase would likely be difficult to implement, especially with likely gridlock in Congress.  As the national Build Back Better projects have mostly stalled in Congress, it may be difficult to gain support for international development as the U.S., like all nations, tries to rebuild after the damage caused by the coronavirus pandemic.  Like the BRI, the U.S. Export-Import Bank has itself participated in climate-harming projects.  If standards at the Export-Import Bank were not revised, the U.S. could ultimately harm the planet in a similar way as the BRI.  This would limit U.S. influence abroad, especially with the efforts of the Biden administration (and previously the Obama administration) to respond to climate change and mitigate risks. 

 

Strategy Two: Institute enforcement on environmental, social, and governance factors of the Belt and Road Initiative through investment and a rejuvenated judicial system.

 

Research from scholarly social institutions provides insight on current environmental and social issues regarding labor within the Belt and Road Initiative. Through the institution of green investment and United Nation Sustainable Development Goals along with the implementation of labor courts within developing countries, it may be possible to alleviate many problems that disproportionately affect lower-income individuals across the globe.

 

Pros: The current Belt and Road Initiative struggles both environmentally and in the protection of labor laws. While economists may point out the added value of the BRI, they fail to consider studies by the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) and Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). The WWF, who primarily studies the effects of climate change on wildlife, concluded that the Belt and Road Initiative overlaps 1,739 biodiverse areas where China’s use of non-renewable coal energy may directly threaten up to 265 species of animals and promote deforestation. We establish support and recommend the WWF’s primary solution of direct financial investment into environmental technical services and implementation of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals to ensure a greener BRI.[11] Regarding labor laws, research by the Council on Foreign Relations indicates that China is using their own citizen's labor in other countries to drive down labor costs and increase productivity. This is an inherent problem to other developing countries as the BRI was initially seen as a way to increase local hirings and wages. Additionally, there have been reports of inhumane working conditions within the BRI.[12] To solve these problems, we recommend that the United States invest in judicial labor court systems and investigation agencies within developing countries to promote a more equal labor system in countries under the Belt and Road Initiative.

 

Cons: The principal downturn to enforcing environmental, social, and governance factors within the Belt and Road Initiative is the cost. The United States is currently not a part of the BRI, and would rather work with G7 countries. For this reason, any investment into the BRI would directly support a cause where that the United States does not stand to see immediate monetary benefits. Such an investment would not only need bipartisan support between the two major U.S. parties but may also not be a favorable investment in the eyes of U.S. citizens struggling on the back of a pandemic and energy crisis. To counteract this downside, a United States alternative could encourage the G7 to establish a partnership with China and the BRI, promoting a more environmentally and developmentally friendly global economy while ensuring that the U.S. also stands to benefit.

 

Strategy Three: Deter corruption within the Belt and Road Initiative through use of economic sanctions.

           

In 2019, President Xi pledged during a summit that China’s BRI will “focus on transparency and clean governance”. During this summit, President Xi reiterated that “Everything should be done in a transparent way and we should have zero tolerance for corruption”.[13] Since this speech, corruption has spread from China to the countries in which their BRI runs through. Corruption is mostly seen in countries which China partners with, some of which struggle to keep a hold on corruption to begin with. Most corruption happens in areas where large scale projects are taking place as it is easier to hand off money in such situations.[14] In some cases, this money is not only pocketed, but sent back to China.[15] Currently the U.S. has placed sanctions on China and the Belt and Road Initiative, but it is not going far enough to stop the corruption. The BRI has led to China pumping billions of dollars into corrupt governments and regimes, further intensifying the corruption.[16] Thus, proving that the current sanctions are inadequate and that they need to be changed. As it stands, the U.S. has sanctioned companies which work with China to develop their Belt and Road Initiative.[17] At one time, the U.S. placed sanctions on Chinese firms which barred them from doing business with U.S. corporations. The sanctions specifically targeted one specific major player in China called the Chinese Communications Construction Company (CCCC) who is responsible for much of the development within the BRI.[18]

            Pros: Implementing stronger sanctions could further limit the spread of the BRI initiative if the correct “targets” are hit, such as the CCCC who’s dealings with the U.S. had been previously sanctioned.[19] Doing so may promote other countries to limit their dealings with specific companies in China, as they are sanctioned by the U.S. (in hopes of giving a warning). Overall, placing sanctions on the BRI may persuade partner countries to find a way out of their agreements, and persuade other counties NOT to engage in the BRI with China.[20] Also, the use of stronger sanctions comes with the fact that China and the U.S. are major trade partners. The potential money that the Chinese could lose due to the strengthened sanctions could, theoretically, slow progress on the BRI.

Cons: As The New Yorker mentions, sanctions are something that are not instantaneous, and the impacts can take a while to be seen. On that same note, The New Yorker states that sanctions do not tend to be the driving factor behind the targets change in ideologies and actions (which would present an issue here).[21] Further sanctioning China’s Belt and Road initiative brings with it the concern that China could turn around and sanction you. In some cases, sanctions have been seen to impact the citizens of those countries being sanctioned. Sanctions which are “too heavy” can lead to humanitarian crises.[22] Placing sanctions on China because of the corruption within the BRI may have unintended consequences for countries who “participate” in the BRI. When combining the BRI debt that China has, and the countries who borrow from China, the sanctions could have a ripple effect harming countries who got roped into the BRI.[23] As it stands, many of the countries tied into the BRI are U.S. allies who may feel the impacts of sanctions on China.[24] Increasing sanctions can also have negative consequences as the tensions with China may heighten to a new level.

 

Recommendation:

            Our recommendation to the Biden Administration is to create effective alternatives to the Belt and Road Initiative so that developing nations may have access to many potential positive benefits.

 

Implementation: Following our recommendation, the Biden Administration would need to develop and present several effective alternatives that would appeal to developing countries and the United States, ensuring America has enough of a foothold within these institutions. Institutions like the World Bank, the Blue Dot Network, and the Build Back Better World can be seen as models in terms of global funding and large-scale acceptance. This in turn would result in the increased availability, appeal, and benefits to the United States and other member countries, while also combatting the inequality and risks acquainted with China’s BRI.

 

Talking Points:

·       Expanding and Revitalizing Existing Systems: Foundational in this strategy is the rejuvenation of existing systems and practices such as the US Export-Import Bank, the World Bank, the Blue Dot Network, and the B3W programs and institutions which will provide developing countries a competitive alternative to China’s BRI.

·       Developing Stronger Relationships with Strategic Regional and Economic Allies: Making an effort to develop stronger relationships with strategic allies such as Japan, Australia, and India will benefit the United States economically long-term. In addition, these invigorated relationships will ease the financial burden of America’s investment into revitalizing these global organizations.

·       Reentering the World Stage: America’s display of strong leadership, especially in defense of global climate, labor, and economic concerns, will help mend the country’s global image and set us up for a new generation of American strength, influence, and integrity

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

  

Works Cited:

 

Abuza, Zachary. “Debt-Trapped: Sri Lanka, Laos, and Now Uganda?” Radio Free Asia, December 1, 2021. https://www.rfa.org/english/commentaries/debt-12012021140345.html. 

Al Jazeera. “China's XI Pledges to 'Fight Corruption' at Belt and Road Summit.” Xi Jinping | Al Jazeera. Al Jazeera, April 26, 2019. https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2019/4/26/chinas-xi-pledges-to-fight-corruption-at-belt-and-road-summit. 

Ascensão, Fernando, Lenore Fahrig, Anthony P Clevenger, Richard T Corlett, Jochen A.G. Jaeger, William F Laurance , and Henrique M Pereira. “Environmental Challenges for the Belt and Road Initiative.” Carleton. Carleton , 2018. https://www.glel.carleton.ca/PDF/landPub/18/18AscensaoetalNatureSustainability.pdf. 

Brancaccio, David, and Rose Conlon. “Former Treasury Secretary Urges Stronger Response to China's Infrastructure Program.” Marketplace, March 23, 2021. https://www.marketplace.org/2021/03/23/former-treasury-secretary-urges-stronger-response-to-chinas-infrastructure-program-belt-and-road-initiative/. 

Cafiero, Giorgio. “Defying Us Caesar Act, China Admits Syria into Bri.” The Cradle. The Cradle, January 14, 2022. https://thecradle.co/Article/analysis/5769. 

Cooper, Elaine. “| The Chartered Institute of Building.” CIOB, May 27, 2019. https://www.ciob.org/media-centre/news/new-report-chinese-belt-and-road-initiative-predicts-boost-global-gdp-%E2%80%9C-over-7. 

Dezenski, Elaine K. “Below the Belt and Road.” FDD. Foundations for Defense of Democracies, June 19, 2020. https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2020/05/04/below-the-belt-and-road/. 

Donmez, Beyza. “US Sanctions China's Ambitious Belt and Road Initiative.” Anadolu Ajansı. AA, August 26, 2020. https://www.aa.com.tr/en/americas/us-sanctions-chinas-ambitious-belt-and-road-initiative/1954194. 

Elliot, Kimberly Ann. “Evidence on the Costs and Benefits of Economic Sanctions.” PIIE. Peterson Institute for International Economics, December 24, 2018. https://www.piie.com/commentary/testimonies/evidence-costs-and-benefits-economic-sanctions. 

“Fact Sheet: President Biden and G7 Leaders Launch Build Back Better World (B3W) Partnership.” The White House. The United States Government, June 16, 2021. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/06/12/fact-sheet-president-biden-and-g7-leaders-launch-build-back-better-world-b3w-partnership/. 

“Fact Sheet: U.S. Strategy on Countering Corruption.” The White House. The United States Government, December 20, 2021. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/12/06/fact-sheet-u-s-strategy-on-countering-corruption/. 

Hanania, Richard. “Ineffective, Immoral, Politically Convenient: America’s Overreliance on Economic Sanctions and What to Do about It.” Cato.org. CATO Institute, February 18, 2020. https://www.cato.org/policy-analysis/ineffective-immoral-politically-convenient-americas-overreliance-economic-sanctions#introduction. 

Hansbrough, Jerre V. “FROM THE BLUE DOT NETWORK TO THE BLUE DOT MARKETPLACE: A WAY TO COOPERATE IN STRATEGIC COMPETITION.” Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific, 2020, 179–89. https://apcss.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/11-Hansborough-25thA.pdf. 

Hermoso, Jesus, and Maria V Fermin. “The Venezuela-China Relationship, Explained: Belt and Road: Part 2 of 4.” SupChina, October 27, 2021. https://supchina.com/2019/01/14/venezuela-china-explained-2/. 

Hillman, Jennifer, and Alex Tippett. “Who Built That? Labor and the Belt and Road Initiative.” Council on Foreign Relations. Council on Foreign Relations, July 6, 2021. https://www.cfr.org/blog/who-built-labor-and-belt-and-road-initiative. 

Hillman, Jennifer, David Sacks, Gary Roughead, and Jacob J Lew. “China's Belt and Road: Implications for the United States.” NCUSCR, March 17, 2022. https://www.ncuscr.org/event/china-belt-and-road/. 

Hillman, Johnathan E. “Corruption Flows along China's Belt and Road.” Corruption Flows Along China's Belt and Road | Center for Strategic and International Studies. Center for Strategic and International Studies. Accessed March 19, 2022. https://www.csis.org/analysis/corruption-flows-along-chinas-belt-and-road. 

Kumar, Abhishek.  “’Blue Dot Network’: Idea, Objectives and Implications for China’s ‘Belt and Road Initiative.’”  International Journal of Novel Research in Humanity and Social Sciences Vol. 7 Issue 4 (July-August 2020).  https://www.noveltyjournals.com/upload/paper/paperpdf-1598528336.pdf.

La Shier, Brian. “Exploring the Environmental Repercussions of China's Belt and Road Initiative.” EESI. Environmental and Energy Institute Study, October 30, 2018. https://www.eesi.org/articles/view/exploring-the-environmental-repercussions-of-chinas-belt-and-road-initiativ. 

Lawder, David. “World Bank: China's Belt and Road Can Speed Development, Needs Transparency.” Reuters. Thomson Reuters, June 18, 2019. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-worldbank-china-belt-idUSKCN1TJ2IX. 

Lew, Jacob J. “How to Counter China's Global Economic Strategy.” What the U.S. Can Do to Counter China's Belt and Road Initiative | Barron's. Barrons, March 26, 2021. https://www.barrons.com/articles/what-the-u-s-can-do-to-counter-china-s-belt-and-road-initiative-51616776010. 

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Meeks, Gregory W. “The Build Back Better World Partnership Could Finally Break the Belt and Road.” Foreign Policy. Foreign Policy, June 28, 2021. https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/06/28/the-build-back-better-world-partnership-could-finally-break-the-belt-and-road/. 

Nolan, Jack, and Wendy Leutert. “Signing up or Standing aside: Disaggregating Participation in China's Belt and Road Initiative.” Brookings. Brookings, March 9, 2022. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/signing-up-or-standing-aside-disaggregating-participation-in-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative/. 

Person, and Guy Faulconbridge Steve Holland. “G7 Rivals China with Grand Infrastructure Plan.” Reuters. Thomson Reuters, June 13, 2021. https://www.reuters.com/world/g7-counter-chinas-belt-road-with-infrastructure-project-senior-us-official-2021-06-12/. 

Sacks, David, and Jennifer Hillman. “How the U.S. Should Respond to China's Belt and Road.” Council on Foreign Relations. Council on Foreign Relations, March 2021. https://www.cfr.org/report/chinas-belt-and-road-implications-for-the-united-states/. 

Shepard, Wade. “How China's Belt and Road Became a 'Global Trail of Trouble'.” Forbes. Forbes Magazine, December 10, 2021. https://www.forbes.com/sites/wadeshepard/2020/01/29/how-chinas-belt-and-road-became-a-global-trail-of-trouble/?sh=4ce42c3443d7. 

Tiezzi, Shannon. “With Latest Sanctions, US Casts a Shadow over China's Belt and Road.” The Diplomat. The Diplomat, August 28, 2020. https://thediplomat.com/2020/08/with-latest-sanctions-us-casts-a-shadow-over-chinas-belt-and-road/. 

Tower, Jason, and Jennifer Staats. “China's Belt and Road: Progress on 'Open, Green and Clean?'.” United States Institute of Peace. USIP, April 29, 2020. https://www.usip.org/publications/2020/04/chinas-belt-and-road-progress-open-green-and-clean. 

Walden, Max. “'Like an Episode of Utopia': What Is the Blue Dot Network?” ABC News. ABC News, November 9, 2019. https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-11-09/blue-dot-network-explainer-us-china-belt-and-road/11682454. 

Widakuswara, Patsy. “'Build Back Better World': Biden's Counter to China's Belt and Road.” VOA. 'Build Back Better World': Biden's Counter to China's Belt and Road, November 4, 2021. https://www.voanews.com/a/build-back-better-world-biden-s-counter-to-china-s-belt-and-road/6299568.html. 

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Wright, Robin. “Why Sanctions Too Often Fail.” The New Yorker. The New Yorker , March 7, 2022. https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/why-sanctions-too-often-fail.

“WWF and Greening the Belt and Road Initiative.” WWF Hong Kong. WWF, November 2, 2017. https://www.wwf.org.hk/en/?19680%2FFeature-Story-WWF-and-Greening-the-Belt-and-Road-Initiative. 

Yang, Hai, and Baldwin Van Gorp. “A Frame Analysis of Political-Media Discourse on the Belt and Road Initiative: Evidence from China, Australia, India, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States.” Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 2021, 1–27. https://doi.org/10.1080/09557571.2021.1968794. 

 

 

 

 

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[1] Elaine Cooper, “| The Chartered Institute of Building,” CIOB, May 27, 2019, https://www.ciob.org/media-centre/news/new-report-chinese-belt-and-road-initiative-predicts-boost-global-gdp-%E2%80%9C-over-7.

[2] Chatzky, and McBride. “China's Massive Belt and Road Initiative.” Council on Foreign Relations, Council on Foreign Relations, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-massive-belt-and-road-initiative.

[3] Jesus Hermoso and Maria V Fermin, “The Venezuela-China Relationship, Explained: Belt and Road: Part 2 of 4,” SupChina, October 27, 2021, https://supchina.com/2019/01/14/venezuela-china-explained-2/.

[4] David Sacks and Jennifer Hillman, “How the U.S. Should Respond to China's Belt and Road,” Council on Foreign Relations (Council on Foreign Relations, March 2021), https://www.cfr.org/report/chinas-belt-and-road-implications-for-the-united-states/.

[5] Jack Nolan and Wendy Leutert, “Signing up or Standing aside: Disaggregating Participation in China's Belt and Road Initiative,” Brookings (Brookings, March 9, 2022), https://www.brookings.edu/articles/signing-up-or-standing-aside-disaggregating-participation-in-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative/.

[6] David Sacks and Jennifer Hillman, “How the U.S. Should Respond to China's Belt and Road,” Council on Foreign Relations (Council on Foreign Relations, March 2021), https://www.cfr.org/report/chinas-belt-and-road-implications-for-the-united-states/.

[7] Jerre V Hansbrough, “FROM THE BLUE DOT NETWORK TO THE BLUE DOT MARKETPLACE: A WAY TO COOPERATE IN STRATEGIC COMPETITION,” Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific, 2020, pp. 179-189, https://apcss.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/11-Hansborough-25thA.pdf.

[8]  Abhishek Kumar, “’Blue Dot Network’: Idea, Objectives and Implications for China’s ‘Belt and Road Initiative.’”  InteInternational Journal of Novel Research in Humanity and Social Sciences Vol. 7 Issue 4 (July-August 2020).  httphttps://www.noveltyjournals.com/upload/paper/paperpdf-1598528336.pdf.

[9] Jerre V Hansbrough, “FROM THE BLUE DOT NETWORK TO THE BLUE DOT MARKETPLACE: A WAY TO COOPERATE IN STRATEGIC COMPETITION,” Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific, 2020, pp. 179-189, https://apcss.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/11-Hansborough-25thA.pdf.

[10] David Lawder, “World Bank: China's Belt and Road Can Speed Development, Needs Transparency,” Reuters (Thomson Reuters, June 18, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-worldbank-china-belt-idUSKCN1TJ2IX.

[11] “WWF and Greening the Belt and Road Initiative,” WWF Hong Kong (WWF, November 2, 2017), https://www.wwf.org.hk/en/?19680%2FFeature-Story-WWF-and-Greening-the-Belt-and-Road-Initiative.

[12] Jennifer Hillman and Alex Tippett, “Who Built That? Labor and the Belt and Road Initiative,” Council on Foreign Relations (Council on Foreign Relations, July 6, 2021), https://www.cfr.org/blog/who-built-labor-and-belt-and-road-initiative.

[13] Al Jazeera, “China's XI Pledges to 'Fight Corruption' at Belt and Road Summit,” Xi Jinping | Al Jazeera (Al Jazeera, April 26, 2019), https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2019/4/26/chinas-xi-pledges-to-fight-corruption-at-belt-and-road-summit.

[14] Jason Tower and Jennifer Staats, “China's Belt and Road: Progress on 'Open, Green and Clean?',” United States Institute of Peace (USIP, April 29, 2020), https://www.usip.org/publications/2020/04/chinas-belt-and-road-progress-open-green-and-clean.

[15] Jason Tower and Jennifer Staats, “China's Belt and Road: Progress on 'Open, Green and Clean?',” United States Institute of Peace (USIP, April 29, 2020), https://www.usip.org/publications/2020/04/chinas-belt-and-road-progress-open-green-and-clean.

[16] Johnathan E Hillman, “Corruption Flows along China's Belt and Road,” Corruption Flows Along China's Belt and Road | Center for Strategic and International Studies (Center for Strategic and International Studies), accessed March 19, 2022, https://www.csis.org/analysis/corruption-flows-along-chinas-belt-and-road.

[17] Shannon Tiezzi, “With Latest Sanctions, US Casts a Shadow over China's Belt and Road,” The Diplomat (The Diplomat, August 28, 2020), https://thediplomat.com/2020/08/with-latest-sanctions-us-casts-a-shadow-over-chinas-belt-and-road/.

[18] Shannon Tiezzi, “With Latest Sanctions, US Casts a Shadow over China's Belt and Road,” The Diplomat (The Diplomat, August 28, 2020), https://thediplomat.com/2020/08/with-latest-sanctions-us-casts-a-shadow-over-chinas-belt-and-road/.

[19] Shannon Tiezzi, “With Latest Sanctions, US Casts a Shadow over China's Belt and Road,” The Diplomat (The Diplomat, August 28, 2020), https://thediplomat.com/2020/08/with-latest-sanctions-us-casts-a-shadow-over-chinas-belt-and-road/.

[20] Shannon Tiezzi, “With Latest Sanctions, US Casts a Shadow over China's Belt and Road,” The Diplomat (The Diplomat, August 28, 2020), https://thediplomat.com/2020/08/with-latest-sanctions-us-casts-a-shadow-over-chinas-belt-and-road/.

[21] Robin Wright, “Why Sanctions Too Often Fail,” The New Yorker (The New Yorker , March 7, 2022), https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/why-sanctions-too-often-fail.

[22] Richard Hanania, “Ineffective, Immoral, Politically Convenient: America’s Overreliance on Economic Sanctions and What to Do about It,” Cato.org (CATO Institute, February 18, 2020), https://www.cato.org/policy-analysis/ineffective-immoral-politically-convenient-americas-overreliance-economic-sanctions#introduction.

[23] Jessica C Liao, “How Bri Debt Puts China at Risk,” – The Diplomat (for The Diplomat, October 27, 2021), https://thediplomat.com/2021/10/how-bri-debt-puts-china-at-risk/.

[24] Giorgio Cafiero, “Defying Us Caesar Act, China Admits Syria into Bri,” The Cradle (The Cradle, January 14, 2022), https://thecradle.co/Article/analysis/5769.

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